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IMPLEMENTING MODERN PUBLIC HEALTH
GOALS THROUGH GOVERNMENT: AN
EXAMINATION OF NEW FEDERALISM AND
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
James G. Hodge, Jr., J.D., LL.M.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Public health law, encompassing the exercise of governmental powers
in the interest of public health, is coextensive with the dynamic field of
public health. The goals of public health necessarily rely, at least in part,
on the use of public health law as a tool. Public health in the United
States, like public health law, has been greatly transformed since the
founding of the American colonies. The goals of public health, once lim-
ited to combatting infectious diseases at the local level,' have expanded
to include the regulation and control of the multi-varied conditions .in
which people can be healthy.2 Since public health regulation traditionally
has relied on the exercise of governmental powers,3 the expansiveness of
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wall Foundation and jointly administered by Georgetown University and Johns Hopkins
University). The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Lawrence 0. Gostin (Ge-
orgetown University Law Center) for his encouragement, review, and substantive assist-
ance in the preparation of this article, and Imron T. Aly, J.D. candidate (Georgetown
University Law Center) for his research assistance.
This article is based in part on the author's substantive article, The Role of New Federal-
ism and Public Health Law, to be published in the Winter 1998 issue (Volume 12) of the
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH.
1. The sovereign law of colonial governments was primarily limited to controlling the
contagion and spread of communicable diseases. It provided for the quarantine of dis-
eased individuals, the vaccination of others, and, to a lesser degree, the improvement of
societal conditions leading to the spread of disease. See Wendy Parmet, Health Care and
the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Farming Era, 20 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 267, 281 (1993).
2. The Institute of Medicine proposes that "[pjublic health is what we, as a society,
do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy." INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).
3. There is perhaps no facet of governmental regulation more important to the public
welfare than the maintenance of public health. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Symposium: Se-
curing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the Health Care System on the Health of
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public health goals is reflective of formative changes in the conception of
American governmental powers.4
The power to act in the interests of public health once resided exclu-
sively in state and local governments.5 Public health regulation was de-
fined predominantly in terms of territorial objectives, which states
attempted to accomplish through virtually plenary police powers. How-
ever, as the states' exclusive power to regulate in the interests of public
health was limited judicially and politically, public health law began to
shift from states to the federal government, largely during the New Deal.6
Public health goals became more national in character and design as au-
thorities were no longer bound to regulations within state lines. National
legislation allowed for uniform regulation of traditional public health
America, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 12 (1994) ("[T]he prevention of disease or disability and
the promotion of health, within reasonable resource constraints, provides the preeminent
justification for the government to act for the welfare of society"); see, e.g., Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (the protection and preservation of the public health is
among the most important duties of state government); see Parmet, supra note 1, at 281
("'Government is, in fact, organized for the express purpose, among others, of conserving
the public health and cannot divest itself of this important duty,"' citing James A. Tobey,
Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126 (1927)).
4. The expansion and development of the field of public health from its modest, early
attempts to control contagious diseases to the varied regulations of conditions affecting
health has greatly relied on law. FRANK P. GRAD, THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 9
(2d ed. 1990). "Law is essential to public health because public health programs are en-
tirely dependent on legislative authorization." Id. (emphasis in original).
5. Among the states' retained powers under the Constitution, collectively known as
the police powers, are the original sovereign powers used during the colonial era to protect
the public health. Under the initial conception of the federalist framework of government,
states and their local subsidiaries virtually had exclusive responsibility for regulating and
controlling matters related to public health. In deference to legislative decision making,
courts rarely struck down state public health regulations. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
__ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2245 (1996).
Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers to
protect the health and safety of their citizens. Because these are 'primarily, and
historically, . . . matter[s] of local concern,' the 'States traditionally have had
great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.'
Id. (citations omitted).
6. Federal control over public health matters significantly increased as a result of the
Court's broad reinterpretations of the Commerce powers and Tax and Spend powers of
Congress during the New Deal era. National interests justified the expansion of federal
powers into areas of traditional state concern. Executive agencies at the national level
were formed pursuant to Congressional legislation with the specific and secondary pur-
poses of improving public health. States' legal objections, based in part on principles of
federalism, were ignored or brushed aside. See Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in
America-An Historical Overview, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFrING BALANCE 11 (Janice C.
Griffith, ed. 1987).
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objectives, as well as public health threats once beyond the scope of the
field.
Federalism has played a vital role in this transition from local to na-
tional governmental powers and corresponding public health goals. Pub-
lic health objectives rely on governmental structures resulting from
federalism interpretations. 7 As a principle of law, federalism distin-
guishes between the limited (although supreme) powers of the federal
government and the broad sovereign powers left to the states via the
Tenth Amendment. As a principle of legal design, it requires the division
of governmental powers for the mutual preservation of national and state
governments, and impliedly creates an enforceable barrier between the
exercises of such authority. In theory, neither state nor federal govern-
ments may impede the respective powers of the other. In practice, how-
ever, an inherent tension exists between the exercise of powers between
state and federal governments.
This tension is the focus of "new federalism" jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court.8 The Court attempts to resolve tensions
between state and federal exercises of government power, in part, by re-
stricting federal powers in governmental areas traditionally reserved to
the states, such as public health.9 By restricting the use of federal powers
in areas of traditional state concern, new federalism has become a sub-
stantive constitutional argument for states attempting to preserve their
eroding sovereign powers.
In an era of national public health objectives, new federalism cannot be
ignored. Ultimately, its principles remind us that the means through
which we pursue our national public health agenda must comport with
7. State exercises of police powers in the interest of public health depend on the non-
interference of the national government in a decentralized, state-based framework. A na-
tional conception of public health law relies on the broad exercise of federal powers in a
centralized, national government. Under either conception, the stability of federalism is
important because its interpretation by the Court influences the particular governmental
framework upon which the conception relies.
8. The modem question of federalism is at what point does federal intrusion into
predominantly state matters exceed the limits of federal powers set forth in the
Constitution.
9. Notable decisions since 1991 have reinforced the original federalism principle of
federal non-interference in areas of traditional state powers, often by emphasizing the im-
portance of the political process. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
(confining Congress' authority to "commandeer" states in the regulation of the disposal of
radioactive wastes); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (restricting Congress'
Commerce powers in its attempt to criminalize the mere possession of a handgun in school
zones).
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our federalist system of government. Without compromising the laudable
national objectives of public health, new federalism encourages us to look
for sources of law other than federal legislation to accomplish public
health ends. In this sense, new federalism challenges our societal concep-
tion of government as the primary source of public health regulation. By
restricting the ability of the federal government to accomplish national,
uniform public health objectives, new federalism suggests that society
must look beyond government to maintain and improve public health. It
invites us increasingly to turn to an entity more powerful than govern-
ment itself, the private health care sector.
This Article explores the development of federalism, state police pow-
ers, and public health over time. Part I correlates the principles of feder-
alism and public health law. Part II examines the traditional nature of
the states' police powers as the original source of authority for public
health laws, and the corresponding localization of public health goals.
Although these powers were once conceived as absolute when exercised
in the interest of public health, this section demonstrates how such pow-
ers were weakened judicially to protect persons from invidious public
health measures. In light of increasing judicial limitations on the exercise
of state police powers, the rise of the federal role in regulating public
health, particularly during the New Deal, and the resulting nationaliza-
tion of public health objectives, is discussed in Part III. Finally, Part IV
discusses new federalism and its present and'future impact on public
health law, and suggests that the private sector may be a valuable outlet
for public health assistance. A brief conclusion follows.
II. CORRELATING FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION
In the context of public health, the federal Constitution "acts as both a
fountain and a levee. It controls the flow of governmental power be-
tween state and federal governments to preserve the public health, and
subsequently curbs that power to protect individual freedoms."' ° If the
Constitution is a fountain from which powers flow to the states," federal-
10. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, Public Health Law, in JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, Sci-
ENCE AND MEDICINE 520 (2d ed. 1996).
11. It is uncertain that the framers or the United States Supreme Court conceived the
Constitution as a source of power to the states since the states simply retained their powers
not otherwise delegated to the federal Congress nor prohibited by the Constitution. See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 87 (1824) ("[T]he constitution gives nothing to the States or
the people. Their rights existed before it was formed; and are derived from the nature of
sovereignty and the principles of freedom.").
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ism represents the partition in the pool from which the states' fountain
draws. It divides the available pool of legislative power into two seg-
ments of government, national and state. 2 As a principle of law and gov-
ernmental design, American federalism preserves a constitutional
balance of power between state and national authorities.13
In practice, federalism distinguishes between the powers exercised by
federal and state governments. The federal government has those limited
powers granted pursuant to the United States Constitution, including the
power to enact laws in its jurisdiction. The remaining sovereign powers
of government are reserved to the states via the Tenth Amendment.14 As
further explained in Part II, these powers, collectively known as police
powers, allow states to broadly regulate matters affecting the health,
safety, and general welfare of the public. They are the original and pri-
mary authority of government to regulate matters that affect the public
health.
To preserve the powers of the federal government from intrusion by
the states, the Supremacy Clause' 5 of the Constitution provides that fed-
12. The essence of federalism is that federal and state governments "[s]hould be lim-
ited to [their] own sphere and, within that sphere, should be independent of the other."
RUTH LOCKE ROETTINGER, THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER: A STUDY
IN FEDERALISM 5 (1957) citing K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1951).
13. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). The principle of federal-
ism emerged from the Constitutional Convention as "the product of compromise." A RE-
PORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE
STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA 7 (1986). A minority of the colonies' delegates to the
Convention, known as the federalists, advocated the creation of a federal government rep-
resenting little more than a loose "compact resting on the good faith of the parties." Id.,
citing DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN
STATES 121 (C.C. Tansill, ed. 1927). Nationalists strongly argued for the formation of a
national government, which would become a central governing authority over the new
states. The resulting Constitution had to satisfy both sides. As nationalist James Madison
would later state: "The proposed Constitution ... is in strictness, neither a national nor a
federal Constitution, but a combination of both." Id. at 8, citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39,
at 246. Initial concerns of the federalists about the strength of the national government
created by the Constitution led to the nationalists' assurance that a bill of rights, including
a provision explicitly reserving to the states their inherent vast sovereign powers, would be
considered by the First Congress. Id. at 9-10. On December 15, 1791, the Tenth Amend-
ment of the Bill of Rights was ratified, thus explicitly reserving to the states or the people
all powers other than those delegated to the United States Congress or prohibited by the
Constitution.
14. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... ").
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eral laws and regulations override conflicting state laws pursuant to the
doctrine of preemption.16 Likewise, with the passage of the Tenth
Amendment, states secured their role in American government by re-
serving sovereign power over "all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people;
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.""7
Since states retained the majority of governmental powers,' in theory
federal legislation which infringed traditional state powers was beyond
Congress' jurisdiction, and thus was neither supreme nor entitled to pre-
emption over state law.' 9
The division between federal and state powers is not always predict-
able.2° The powers of federal and state governments collide on a regular
16. State law is deemed preempted by federal constitutional or statutory law either by
express provision, see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); by a
conflict between federal and state law, see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981);
New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 653 (1995); or by implication where "Congress so thoroughly occupies a legislative
field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it." See Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982),
quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961),
quoted in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
18. A REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY
COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 10. So powerful were the states under the original balance of
power among the national and state governments that Alexander Hamilton commented
"there is greater probability of encroachments by the [states] upon the federal [govern-
ment] than by the federal [government] upon the [states];" id. at 9, citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 31, at 197. Federal exercises of power interfering with state powers were virtually
inconceivable. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992):
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been
unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not
have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second,
because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government,
rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities.
Id. (emphasis added).
19. As Alexander Hamilton observed during the drafting of the Constitution, it does
not follow "that acts of the [national government] which are not pursuant to its constitu-
tional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the [States] will be-
come the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will
deserve to be treated as such." THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204.
20. "The meaning of federalism, after all, has been the primary political issue for most
of American history. . . ." R. Shep Melnick, Statutory Reconstruction: The Politics of Es-
kridge's Interpretation, 84 GEO. L.J. 91, 120 (1995), although the original distribution of
powers between governments was meant to be relatively clear. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 44 (1971) ("[Federalism involves] a proper respect for state functions,... and ... the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
New Federalism and Public Health Law
basis, at which point federalism takes on many shades and "almost im-
perceptible gradations."'" Public health law, which is comprised of those
laws and regulations passed, enforced, and adjudicated at the federal,
state, and local levels of government regulating the conditions affecting
public health,22 involves such a collision between federal and state
powers.
Federalism requires us to ask which level of government has the re-
sponsibility for passing, enforcing, and adjudicating which public health
laws. The answer is not an absolute. Federal and state governments can
share jurisdiction in the field. Yet where federal and state powers inter-
sect, struggles over the exercise of limited governmental powers occur.
The resolution of such disputes is uniquely within the province of federal-
ism. States' traditional ability to control and maintain public health re-
mains contingent on the scope of their police powers, and the extent of
federal intrusion. This, in turn, depends on the emphasis placed on feder-
alism:23 when enforced, federalism protects police powers of the states by
curbing federal infringements on such powers.24 It simultaneously re-
stricts the federal government's ability to regulate in the interests of pub-
lic health, since such regulation traditionally has been the responsibility
of state governments. In the balance of these observations rest the very
goals of public health that rely on the interpretation of federalism.
left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways."). Judicial federalism
represents neither a bright line nor visible boundary between state and federal powers. See
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) ("the task of ascertaining the constitutional
line between federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult
and celebrated cases.").
21. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 277 (1979).
22. GRAD, supra note 4, at 4; see also Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law: A
Review, 2 CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC HEALTH 205 (1996), defining public health law in
terms of the study of relationships of organized society (principally government), the
health of populations, and the rights of individuals as:
The study of the legal powers and duties of organized society to assure the condi-
tions for people to be healthy (e.g., to identify, quantify, prevent, and ameliorate
risks to health in the population), and the limitations on the power of organized
society to constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, property, or other legally pro-
tected interests of individuals for the purposes of protection or promotion of com-
munity health.
Id.
23. See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 771, 772
(1996) ("Federalism [identifies] the rules of the game under which the process of decision-
making and exercise of government power will proceed.").
24. See, e.g., Daniel M. Kolkey, The Constitutional Cycles of Federalism, 32 IDAHo L.
REV. 495, 502 (1996) ("Federalism can thus be a way of providing a restraint on the expan-
sion of federal power.").
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III. THE LOCALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION UNDER
STATE POLICE POWERS
Consistent with the division of powers between the levels of govern-
ments, those broad powers not delegated to the federal government nor
prohibited to them by the Constitution 25 are reserved for the states via
the Tenth Amendment. These powers are traditionally known as "police
powers."26 In a legal sense, police powers in American jurisprudence de-
note the power of state governments to promote the public welfare by
restraining and regulating private individuals' rights to liberty and uses of
property. Broad in scope,28 police powers defy a singular meaning.29
They are "neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete defini-
tion,"3° but rather represent the broad expression of legislative determi-
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, 292-93 (James Madison) (Clifford Rossiter ed. 1961),
quoted in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) ("The powers delegated by the pro-
posed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.").
26. The term "police powers" first appeared in the landmark decision of the United
States Supreme Court, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (reported in TOM CHRISTOFFEL
& STEPHEN P. TERET, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC: LEGAL ISSUES IN INJURY PREVENTION 30
(1993); but see ROETTINGER, supra note 12, at 10 (reporting that Chief Justice Marshall
first used the term in the 1827 decision, Brown v. Maryland (citation omitted)).
Police powers originate in the inherent need of government to restrain the private ac-
tions of citizens to reduce the negative transgressions of such actions on the private rights
or property of another. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMI-
TATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1886). The police power rests on
the latin maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (so use your own that you do not
injure that of another). Police powers, it is said, are the function of government by which
this maxim is enforced. See, e.g., 16A AM. JUR. 2D Const. Law § 368 (1979). As one au-
thor theorizes, "police powers have their origin in the law of necessity." Where individual
actions or other elements constitute threats to the public welfare, governments should be
able to use their powers to reduce, deter, or enjoin the resulting harms to society. W.P.
PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAW OF OVERRULING NECESSITY 4
(1894).
27. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS 3-4 (1904).
28. The police powers "form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which em-
braces everything within the territory of the state, not surrendered to the general govern-
ment; all of which can advantageously be exercised by the states themselves. Inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description . . . are component parts of this
mass." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 87 (1824) (emphasis added). The scope of police
powers is the broadest of any field of American governmental activity. JAMES A. TOBEY,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 33 (1926). It extends to all public needs. As a result, it is not con-
fined to narrow categories or interpretations. See ROETrINGER, supra note 12, at 11.
29. Although "generally understood and universally recognized," 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 362 (1979), the composition of police powers is rather ambiguous.
30. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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nations. In this sense, the exercise of police powers is constantly
evolving.
Legal theory supports that the Constitutional drafters supposed the
pre-existence of sovereign police powers.31 They intended the reserva-
tion of police powers to the states to be exclusive, thus depriving the fed-
eral government of any comparable powers. As the Supreme Court has
explained, the Tenth Amendment "disclosed the widespread fear that the
National Government might, under the pressure of a supposed general
welfare, attempt to exercise power which it had not been granted.., the
framers intended that no such assumption should ever find justification
[in the Constitution]."3 Thus, police powers, reserved exclusively to the
states, are the broadest and least Iimitable 33 source of authority and sup-
port for government action in the United States.
In the field of public health law, state police powers constitute the orig-
inal34 and logical35 source of governmental authority.36 Public health reg-
31. The Constitution historically has been construed with reference to the fact that
preservation of the states' police powers was an integral presumption. Id.; see also LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 379 (2d ed. 1988). This presumption
took form in the language of the Tenth Amendment, which the Supreme Court has inter-
preted to reserve police powers to the states. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
"[Tihe constitution gives nothing to the States or the people. Their rights existed before it
was formed; and are derived from the nature of sovereignty and the principles of free-
dom." Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
32. ROETI-INGER, supra note 12, at 6 (citing Kansas v. Colorado (citation omitted)).
33. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946) ("The police power is
one of the least limitable of government powers.").
34. Public health laws, originally calling for the isolation of the ill or quarantine of
those exposed to contagious diseases, have been passed at the local level under the
equivalent of police power since the formation of the colonies. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 2, at 57. The colony of Virginia passed a vital statistics law to track the health of
the community in 1631. Massachusetts enacted the first sanitary legislation in America
when it passed a maritime quarantine act in 1648 due to the threat of disease from the West
Indies. A year earlier, Massachusetts also enacted a law to prevent the pollution of Boston
Harbor. JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIC HEALTH' LAW: A MANUAL OF LAW FOR SANATARIANS
10 (1926). Additional quarantine laws related to incoming sea vessels, loaded with goods
and often disease, were passed in Maryland (1784), New Hampshire (1789), Virginia
(1792), Georgia (1793), Connecticut (1795), and Delaware (1797). See Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1, 114-15 (1824).
35. As one legal commentator has stated "[t]he exercise of the police power is really
what [state] government is about: It defines the very purpose of government. Thus, on the
state level, the power to provide for and protect the public health is a basic, inherent power
of the government." GRAD, supra note 4, at 10; see also KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND
THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 19-20 (2d ed. 1985). For informative historical accounts of the po-
lice power, see Deborah Jones Merritt, The Constitutional Balance Between Health and
Liberty, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Dec. 1986 (Supp.) at 2; Parmet, supra note 1, at 267.
36. Police powers are not the only state powers used in matters related to the public
1997]
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ulation lies at the core of the police power.37 State regulations in the
interest of public health are not limited to the prevention and control of
contagious or dangerous diseases through such measures as quarantine
38
and vaccination, 39 but include such matters as sanitation,4 ° anti-pollution
and fluoridation of water supplies, licensing and regulation of occupa-
tions,41 and injury prevention.42
health. The states' exercise of its territorial jurisdiction under its parens patriae powers
occasionally comes to play. The doctrine of parens patriae (literally meaning "parent [or
father] of the state") stems from the English statutory duty of the king, as father of his
country, to provide and care for the less able citizens of society, the likes of which origi-
nally included idiots, lunatics, and orphans. See Neil B. Posner, The End of Parens Patriae
in New York: Guardianship Under The New Mental Hygiene Law Article 81, 79 MARQ. L.
REV. 603, 604 (1996); Lisa Moscati Hawkes, Parens Patriae and the Union Carbide Case:
The Disaster at Bhopal Continues, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181, 186 (1988). The parens pa-
triae powers were modified by states in light of the federal structure of government. Id. at
186. Parens patriae powers were expanded to become "a tool that states use to protect the
well-being of their citizens when no one citizen has standing to sue and thus cannot remedy
the problem." Id. at 186-87. Thus, where a state can show it has a "quasi-sovereign" inter-
est in protecting its citizens from certain activities or conduct of corporations, individuals,
or other states, it may sue on the citizens' behalf to enjoin such actions. See, e.g., Louisiana
v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900) (reviewing the State of Louisiana's attempt to enjoin a quaran-
tine regulation enacted by the State of Texas banning the importation of all goods from
New Orleans in light of an alleged threat of yellow fever. Although the Court denied
jurisdiction to determine the propriety of the regulation, it recognized the position of Loui-
siana "in the attitude of parens patriae, trustee, guardian or representative of all her citi-
zens.., to seek relief.., because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large.").
Id. at 19; see also Amelia C. Waller, State Standing in Police Misconduct Cases: Expanding
the Boundaries of Parens Patriae, 16 GA. L. REV. 865, 874 n.52 (1982); see also Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (enjoining the Sanitary District of Chicago from discharging
raw sewage into the Des Plaines River, a tributary to the Mississippi River. The Court
upheld Missouri's parens patriae power to seek the injunction as a legitimate sovereign
interest). Id. at 241.
37. Parmet, supra note 1, at 272 ("Public health regulation has long been regarded as
one of the states' primary and most important 'police powers."'). See also Women's Com-
munity Health Ctr. of Beaumont, Inc. v. Texas Health Facilities Comm'n, 685 F.2d 974, 980
& n. 11, citing Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251 (1829);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); Sporhase v. Ne-
braska, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3463 (1982) ("[a] State's power to regulate.., for the
purposes of protecting the health of its citizens ... is at the core of its police power.").
38. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 145 (1890); Morgan's L. & T. R. & S.S. Co.
v. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
39. See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905).
40. Private individuals may be required to update or modify their sanitation systems,
plumbing, or mere living conditions to maintain a healthy environment under the police
power. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 33 (1968). However, the police power does not extend to
appropriations of private property not otherwise creating a health nuisance or hazard with-
out compensation to the property owner. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. at § 25.
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With the formation of local health boards,43 state public health laws
and regulations proliferated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.' From the onset, courts were highly deferential to state public
health regulations.45 Laws or regulations necessary to protect the public
health were considered legislative questions for local and state health au-
thorities, not questions subject to judicial review. The court's perceived
role was limited primarily to determining whether health officials acted
within their permissible jurisdiction, or had otherwise abused their au-
thority. In general, courts validated any regulation of local health author-
ities reasonably calculated to preserve the health of the public.
46
Some courts were skeptical of compulsory public health actions pur-
porting to protect the public, but which in reality involved some arbitrary
interference with private entities or imposed unusual or unnecessary re-
strictions on lawful activities.47 Although the constitutional foundation
for the exercise of compulsory police powers was public health neces-
42. CHRISTOFFEL & TERET, supra note 26, at 25-28.
43. The first local health board reportedly was organized in Baltimore, Maryland in
1793. Philadelphia followed suit a year later. In 1797, Massachusetts promulgated a law
providing for the organization of health boards in towns and delegating to these boards the
power to make regulations. Health boards formed in other towns across the new nation as
states copied the Massachusetts model. Thus, public health duties among the first states of
the Union were delegated, early on, to local boards at the municipal level. TOBEY, supra
note 28, at 44; see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 62. Only later did state
governments form state-wide boards of health, Louisiana being the first to do so in 1855
(although the District of Columbia formed its district-wide board as early as 1822). To-
BEY, supra note 28, at 11.
44. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law:
Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 739 (1986); Wendy Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine:
The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985).
45. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Smith, 163 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Ark. 1942)
("[p]rivate rights ... must yield in the interest of the public security, [venereal disease]
affects the public health so intimately and so insidiously, that consideration of delicacy and
privacy may not be permitted to thwart measures necessary to avert the public peril."). In
some cases, judicial deference was absolute as courts suggested that police power regula-
tion was immune from constitutional review, expressing the notion that "where the police
power is set in motion in its proper sphere, the courts have no jurisdiction to stay the arm
of the legislative branch." See Arizona v. Southern Pacific Co., 145 P.2d 530 (1943), quot-
ing State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court, 174 P. 973, 976 (1918)); see also Lawrence 0.
Gostin, The Americans With Disabilities Act and the Corpus of Anti-Discrimination Law: A
Force for Change in the Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 89, 91
(1993) ("The early courts were highly deferential to state public health regulation under
the police powers. To some courts, the Constitution had 'no application to this class of
case,"' citing In re Caselli, 204 P. 364, 364 (1922)).
46. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 22 (1968) (citations omitted).
47. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
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sity,48 the exercise of such powers outside this standard was occasionally
subject to strict judicial review.4 9 Many courts required medical proof
that individuals subjected to compulsory public health powers actually
were infectious when control measures were imposed.5" In Jew Ho v.
Williamson,51 a federal court in 1900 voided a quarantine measure to con-
trol bubonic plague among Chinese immigrants, finding that the action,
which actually posed a danger to the health of the community,5" was
passed as a guise for discrimination against the Chinese community.53
The scope of public health powers was further clarified in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts54 in 1905. Although the Supreme Court rejected a consti-
tutional challenge against a Massachusetts vaccination law on the grounds
48. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (stating that the right of a
state to protect the public health can arise only from a vital necessity, and cannot be car-
ried beyond the scope of that necessity).
49. Where doubt was raised as to the actual purpose of the exercise of compulsory
public health powers, courts delved into legislative directives and history to interpret the
true intent of specific regulations.
50. See, e.g., Ex parte Martin, 188 P.2d 287 (Cal. App. 1948) (public health officials
must have "probable cause" to quarantine pending an opportunity for further investigation
or examination); Ex parte Shepard, 195 P. 1077 (Cal. App. 1921) (court specifically re-
jected proposition that mere suspicion is sufficient to uphold a quarantine order); Ex parte
Arata, 198 P. 814 (Cal. App. 1921) (court required that reasonable ground must exist to
support the claim that the person is afflicted with venereal disease); Ex parte Dillon, 186 P.
170 (Cal. App. 1919) (marital status cannot constitute "reasonable cause" for suspicion of
venereal disease); People v. Tait, 103 N.E. 750 (Ill. 1913) (family member not residing in
household affected by scarlet fever should not be quarantined). As one court in New York
held in 1896: "[t]he mere possibility that persons might have been exposed to such disease
[smallpox] is not sufficient [to impose control measures] ... they must 'have been exposed
to it, and that the conditions actually exist for a communication of the contagion."' Smith
v. Emery, 42 N.Y.S. 258, 260 (citing In re Smith, 40 N.E. 497, 498-99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1895).
The Emery court went on to insist that these issues are to be determined by "medical
science and skill," not "common knowledge." Id. at 260.
51. 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
52. Id. at 22 ("It must necessarily follow that, if a large territory is quarantined, inter-
communications of the people within that territory will rather tend to spread the disease
than to restrict it.").
53. Id. at 24.
54. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The case concerned the validity of a Massachusetts state law
requiring local boards of health to vaccinate citizens when necessary in the interests of
public health or safety. Such vaccinations were to be provided without charge, although
anyone who refused to comply could be fined. Id. at 12. Pursuant to this state law, the
Board of Health of the City of Cambridge adopted a regulation requiring the smallpox
vaccination or re-vaccination of all city residents. Id. Jacobson, unwilling to be vaccinated
or pay a fine, was brought to court by the State on criminal charges of refusing or neglect-
ing to comply with the regulation. Id. at 13. His essential argument was that the vaccina-
tion requirement invaded his right to liberty under the federal Constitution in so much as it
constituted an "assault upon his person." Id. at 26.
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that it infringed individual liberties in violation of the Due Process
Clause, it simultaneously limited state police powers exercised in the in-
terest of public health. The Court affirmed that police powers were not
absolute and could not be exercised to regulate public health matters
outside a state's territory or in contravention of the federal Constitu-
tion." Nor does police power authority extend to the enactment of blan-
ket provisions restricting personal freedoms in the name of public health.
Rather, public health laws must have some "real or substantial relation to
the protection of the public health and the public safety."56
Jacobson remains a forceful statement of the constitutional limits of the
exercise of police powers in the interest of public health. Although the
Court's "arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable" 58 standard of review is
deferential to state public health regulations, regulatory measures that
are wholly irrational, indiscriminate, or enacted in bad faith are unconsti-
tutional.59 As the principles of Jacobson were enforced more regularly by
55. See id. at 25. In rejecting Jacobson's argument, the court relied upon the authority
of states to enact mandatory vaccination statutes under the police powers. A state's police
powers authorize it to enact "all laws that relate to matters completely within its territory
and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people of other States." Id. (em-
phasis added). This includes, of course, "health laws of every description." Id.
56. See id. at 31. In upholding the statutory exercise of power in Jacobson, the Court
deferred to the judgment and testimony of state and local board of health officials, as well
as the commonly-held medical position of the time, that smallpox vaccinations were instru-
mental in limiting the spread and impact of the disease. Id. at 34-35. Yet, public health
measures, such as mandatory vaccination laws, cannot be administered against anyone who
"with reasonable certainty" can show he is not a "fit subject of vaccination," id. at 39, or
would suffer a serious impairment to his health as a result of vaccination, or that such
would likely cause his death. Id.
57. See Gostin, supra note 45, at 92 ("modern constitutional review is remarkably simi-
lar in approach to Jacobson").
58. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28, 38.
59. In spite of the Court's admonitions, some state courts continued their practice of
almost blind deference to the exercise of police powers by health boards. In a 1913 case,
State v. Rackowski, 86 A. 606 (Conn. 1913), the Connecticut Supreme Court did not re-
quire any more than "common knowledge" evidence in deciding whether or not a person
had scarlet fever for the purpose of imposing public health measures. Id. at 608. In Kirk v.
Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909), an elderly woman with anaesthetic leprosy was isolated
even though there was "hardly any danger of contagion." Id. She had lived in the commu-
nity for many years, attended church services, taught in school, and mingled in social life
without ever communicating the disease. The South Carolina Supreme Court thought it
"manifest that the board [was] well within [its] duty in requiring the victim of it to be
isolated [when the] distressing nature of the malady is regarded." Id. The only consolation
offered by the court was that the victim's isolation must wait for the completion of a "com-
fortable cottage" outside the city limits, rather than the shotgun pesthouse within a hun-
dred yards of the city's trash dump, which the health board proposed as an adequate place
for Mrs. Kirk. Id. at 391. See also Gostin, supra note 45, at 91 ("Even as late as 1966, a
1997]
106 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:93
state and federal courts, public health measures were subjected to in-
creased scrutiny to eliminate perceived abuses on individual rights
through the exercise of state police powers.
IV. NATIONALIZING PUBLIC HEALTH OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
That police powers exercised in the interests of public health were no
longer considered absolute, but, rather, were subject to increasing re-
straints in the interests of protecting individual federal constitutional
rights, represents a transition from state to federal influence in public
health law. Coextensive with this judicial influence, the federal executive
branch commenced a systematic campaign during the New Deal to regu-
late public health through a drastic shift in governmental power.6"
Prior to the New Deal era, the federal government's role in the field of
public health was limited to the provision of health services to the mili-
tary61 and the passage of legislation with limited relation to core public
health objectives. 62 The Federal Maternity and Infancy Act 6 3 was the
court held that 'drastic measures for the elimination of disease are not affected by constitu-
tional provisions, either of the state or national government."' (citations omitted)).
60. In practice, however, the history of American government has seen the gradual
centralization and consolidation of governmental power into the national realm, contrary
to the vision of the Union's founders. ROEITINGER, supra note 12, at 12. "Despite the
preeminence of the States in matters of public health and safety, in recent decades the
Federal Government has played an increasingly significant role in the protection of the
health of our people." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, _ U.S. -, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1996).
There are many factors which have contributed to this long-term development, including
varying patterns of economic growth, shifts in population to urban areas, societal changes,
and, of course, the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment. ROETrINGER, supra note
12, at 14. However, the historical backdrop for the major centralization of American gov-
ernment lies in the policies and practices of the federal government during the New Deal
(1933-1946). See generally, Lesser, supra note 6, at 6.
61. Early federal involvement in public health began with the establishment of the
Marine Hospital Service to care for merchant seamen who had no local citizenship and
thus could not rely on state health services. A national board of health, adopted in 1879 to
take over the responsibilities of the Marine Hospital Service, was opposed by the states
and the Service alike, and was promptly disassembled in 1883. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
supra note 2, at 62. Four years later, however, the National Hygienic Laboratory was es-
tablished in the Marine Hospital in Staten Island, New York. Id. at 66-67. Later, in 1930,
the Laboratory would relocate in Washington, D.C. under its new name, the National Insti-
tute of Health. By 1912, the Marine Hospital Service was renamed the United States Pub-
lic Health Service, although its services to the public remained modest in their extent. Id.
at 68.
62. In 1906, Congress passed what has been called "its first significant legislation in the
field of public health," the Food and Drug Act, in its national effort to regulate the manu-
facture, labeling, and sale of food. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, __ U.S. -, 116 S. Ct.
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first federal law to provide direct federal funding for personal health serv-
ices for mothers and children.' The receipt of federal funds was condi-
tioned on the states' development of an obstetrics plan for the care and
treatment of expectant mothers to be administered by a state agency.
The ability of Congress to condition the state's receipt of federal funds
upon compliance with federal guidelines, standards, or requirements
would become one of many factors leading to increased national involve-
ment in public health regulation.
During the great legislation rush of the New Deal,65 President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt ("FDR") relied on enhanced interpretations of the
Spending Power to condition the states' receipt of federal funds on the
performance of federal objectives. The President also argued that the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorized Congress to spend money in aid
of the general welfare. In addition, FDR sought to expand the Com-
merce Clause to provide Congress the broad power to legislate in the
interest of interstate commerce in areas traditionally under state and lo-
cal control. The culmination of these political and legislative acts
threatened traditional federalism, which reserved much of the legislative
subject-matter to the control of the states.
Although initially interpreting federalism conservatively in favor of the
states,66 the Supreme Court succumbed to political pressure in 1937,67
2240, 2246 (1996). The Chamberlain-Kahn Act of 1914 established the U.S. Interdepart-
mental Social Hygiene Board, which set forth a comprehensive venereal disease control
program for the military, but also provided funds to the states for the quarantine of in-
fected civilians. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 67. The Department of Labor
housed the Children's Bureau, which investigated the causes of infant mortality and issues
of child hygiene, and the Women's Bureau which concerned itself with the health and
welfare of women in industry. TOBEY, supra note 28, at 26-27.
63. TOBEY, supra note 28, at 27 (also known as the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1922).
64. INsTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 67. The Children's Bureau was charged
with administering the Act creating the Federal Board of Maternity and Infant Hygiene,
and providing funds to states to initiate programs in maternal and child health.
65. Lesser, supra note 6, at 7 (FDR began his presidency with the passage of fifteen
separate national acts in Congress within his first hundred days in office).
66. The Court invalidated numerous pieces of New Deal legislation on the grounds
that the federal Commerce power did not reach the specified local activities of the legisla-
tion under the principles of federalism. Lesser, supra note 8, at 7. As the Court stated in
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), which invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933, the expansion of the Commerce power in the federal government might oblit-
erate "the independence of the individual states ... and [convert] the United States ...
into a central government exercising uncontrolled police power in every state of the Union,
superseding all local control or regulation of the affairs or concerns of the states." Id. at 77.
67. FDR, unwilling to accept the Court's hard-lined, federalist approach, threatened it
with his "court-packing" plan. He proposed that the President would be able to appoint
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issuing a series of decisions leading to federal centralization under the
Commerce and Spending powers.6 8 These decisions collectively upheld:
(1) the use of federal tax and spending powers solely for matters related
to the general welfare; (2) the conditioning of federal grants to the states
on their acceptance of congressionally mandated requirements; and, (3)
the constitutionality of both practices despite the Tenth Amendment.69
In 1941, the Court's decision in United States v. Darby,7" upholding the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, clarified that Congress' commerce
power was not limited by the states' police power. In so much as the
Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been' surrendered,"'71 the Court held that congressional exercises of com-
merce power may be "attended by the same incidents which attend the
exercise of the police power of the states."72 Darby dispelled all rumors
that traditional federalism was simply on the decline; rather, it appeared
federalism was gasping its last breath.7 3
The reinterpreted Commerce Clause, together with other broad federal
powers, effectively gave the federal government national police powers."
Over the next few decades, Congress would use its reinterpreted powers
to introduce national policies and objectives into many areas previously
reserved for the states, including public health, with general acquiescence
one new Supreme Court Justice, up to a maximum of six, for every Justice who, having
reached age seventy and having served for ten years, failed to retire. The plan was immedi-
ately challenged on constitutional grounds, but ultimately was not acted upon by Congress.
Lesser, supra note 6, at 7.
68. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
National Labor Relations Act, which guaranteed the right of collective bargaining for la-
bor forces); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding employer's tax to
fund unemployment compensation under the Social Security Act of 1935); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding tax to fund old-age benefits under the Social Secur-
ity Act of 1935); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (upholding
the validity of various provisions of the Alabama Unemployment Compensation Law).
69. Lesser, supra note 6, at 8.
70. 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
71. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
72. Id. at 114.
73. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 23 (1950).
As one author stated, "legal federalism," conceived, debated, and drafted into our consti-
tutional framework to act as a true barrier between state and federal governmental power,
"is dead." Lesser, supra note 6, at 11, citing Richard B. Cappalli, Restoring Federalism
Values in the Federal Grant System, 19 URB. LAW. 499 (1987). What remained was a sort of
"political federalism," used in token fashion to argue for or against the continued federal
intrusion of states' traditional powers. Lesser, supra note 6, at 11-12, citing Cappalli at 506.
74. Lesser, supra note 6, at 9.
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by the courts.75 "Federal programs in disease control, research, and epi-
demiology expanded throughout the mid-twentieth century,, 76 as did fed-
eral social reform and welfare programs. 77 Activities of state and local
public health authorities increasingly were influenced or overtaken by
federal programs, grants, initiatives, or laws. Modern federal regulations
concern broad areas of public health such as air and water quality,78 food
and drug safety,79 tobacco advertising,8" pesticide production and sales,
consumer product safety, occupational health and safety, and medical
75. Id. at 10-11.
76. The National Institute of Health ("NIH") significantly expanded its research mis-
sion to include the study and investigation of all diseases. In 1937, the National Cancer
Institute became the first of many institutes within NIH to concentrate its efforts on a
particular disease or condition. INsTITUrE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 68. Other insti-
tutes within the NIH include, among others, the Institute for Neurological and Communi-
cative Disorders and Stroke, the Institute for Child Health and Human Development, the
Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, and the Institute of Mental Health. Id. In
1938, Congress passed a venereal disease control act, in addition to the Chamberlain-Kahn
Act of 1914. This second act provided federal funds to the states for investigation and
control of venereal diseases. The Federal Security Agency was established in 1939 and
within it the Public Health Service and national programs in education and welfare were
created. The National Mental Health Act of 1946 established the National Institute of
Mental Health as part of the NIH which was instrumental in financing training programs
for mental health professionals and the development of local community health services.
Id. Two decades later, the Partnership in Health Act of 1966 provided federal funding of
state and local activities concerning public health as an incentive for the further develop-
ment of such services at the subnational level. Id. at 68-69. The Comprehensive Health
Planning Act of 1967 allowed federal funding of neighborhood or community health cen-
ters, which although governed by local boards, relied on the federal government for policy
and program direction.
77. The Social Security Act of 1935 included within its many titles a federal grant-in-
aid program to encourage states to establish and maintain public health services and train
public health personnel. "Supporters of the [Social Security Act said] that its operation
[was] not a constraint [on state's rights], but the creation of a larger freedom, the states and
the nation joining in a co-operative endeavor to avert a common evil." Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587 (1938) (upholding the Social Security Act). Subsequent
titles (Titles 18 and 19, respectively) to the Social Security Act in 1966 established the
Medicare and Medicaid programs providing federal payments for health services to the
elderly and joint federal-state payments for health services to the poor. INSTTUTE OF
MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 68.
78. See, e.g., Acorn v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1388 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining the
purpose of the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, which amended the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, to regulate levels of lead in supplies of drinking water).
79. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, __ U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2245-46 (1996) (detailing
the history and purposes of the Food and Drug Act of 1906).
80. See Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 513-16 (1992) (outlining the
history of federal legislation regulating the advertising of tobacco products and health
warning requirements).
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care.8" As the Institute of Medicine has recently summarized, the federal
government:
surveys the population's health status and health needs, sets pol-
icies and standards, passes laws and regulations, supports bi-
omedical and health services research, helps finance and
sometimes delivers personal health services, provides technical
assistance and resources to state and local health systems, pro-
vides protection against international health threats, and sup-
ports international efforts toward global health.82
The expansion of national powers into the field of public health prompted
changes in public health objectives and a fundamental restructuring of
public health philosophy. 83 Public health goals were centralized and re-
formed to utilize the new national government powers ushered in during
the New Deal. Merely controlling the effects of public health problems
became inadequate. National powers allowed for the broad regulation of
81. The Clinton Administration has identified several areas within the field of public
health where national oversight is recommended, including infectious diseases, chronic and
environmentally-related diseases, violence and injury control, comprehensive school
health, maternal and child health, public health surveillance, epidemiologic services, and
information networks. THE WHITE HOUSE DOM. POL'Y COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT'S
HEALTH SECURITY PLAN: THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT 165-69 (1993).
82. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 165. The U.S. Public Health Service,
now a part of the Department of Health and Human Services, is the federal unit with
primary responsibility for national public health. Its organization includes the Centers for
Disease Control ("CDC"); NIH; the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"); the Health
Resources and Services Administration; the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
Administration; and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. The Public
Health Service is not the only federal agency concerned with public health on a national
scale. According to the Institute of Medicine, other federal agencies or department divi-
sions handle health-related problems of a specific nature or population. Such include the
medical divisions of the armed forces, the Veteran's Administration, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, the Agricultural Extension Service, the Department of Education, the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, the Bureau of
Labor Standards, the Bureau of Mines, the Maritime Commission, multiple bureaus within
the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Employee's Compensation. In addi-
tion, the Environmental Protection Agency provides invaluable assistance in public health
concerns such as water and air pollution, hazardous waste cleanup, pesticide control, and
radiation protection. Id. at 192. The Health Care Financing Administration, also part of
the Department of Health and Human Services, operates the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams. Id. at 166-67.
83. The "new paradigms" of public health law presuppose a national public health
system working within an international penumbra. They include: (1) the focus on scientifi-
cally objective assessments of significant risk rather than remote or speculative risks; (2)
ecologic understandings of injury and disease rather than discrete causes; and, (3) a syner-
gistic relationship between public health and human rights. See Gostin, supra note 22, at
210.
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the very conditions that led to such problems. Public health strategy
shifted from preventing and treating localized public health dilemmas to
controlling the conditions in which such effects arose.
Regardless of the attributes of the centralization of public health ef-
forts,' it is an important observation of the New Deal era that the dissim-
ilation of traditional federalism has led to the creation of our existing
national public health agenda.
V. NEW FEDERALISM AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
A. Modern Interpretation of Federalism
The reconception of public health from a purely local to a national con-
cern occurred simultaneously with an interpretive change in federalism.
Although designed to uphold states' powers against federal intrusion,
federalism was reduced to a mere political theory of American govern-
ment during the New Deal. As a result, our modern public health system
is driven by national priorities in the pursuit of national goals.s5 While
the existing allocation of powers between federal and state governments
seems well-suited to accomplish national public health objectives, this al-
location is once again the subject of legal and political debate.
A revitalized interest in traditional federalism has flooded political and
judicial circles. What has been coined "new federalism" 86 is a principle of
political change spurred by mini-revolutions among the states and en-
veloped in the idea that the existing powers of the federal government
should be limited.87 While new federalism is partially the result of in-
84. There are many attributes of a nationalized public health system, including the de-
emphasis on the varied and confusing web of state public health laws which had developed
over decades of exclusive state control over the field. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al.,
Reforming Public Health Law, - MILBANK Q. - (1996).
85. GRAD, supra note 4, at 14 ("Through ... categorical grant-in-aid programs, the
federal government influences the manner in which public health is administered and the
methods of service delivery. The taxing and spending power clearly has as much impact on
public health as does the more direct exercise of power under the interstate commerce
clause.").
86. The term "new federalism" may have been used first by Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. in
his article, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
87. Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 76-77. Whether
the concept is a necessarily recent development is itself a point of debate. In 1957, Ruthe
Locke Roettinger hoted in her book THE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER: A
STUDY IN FEDERALISM that "[t]he states were never more loved than they are today.
There is much talk about bringing government back home from Washington. The states
hold the answers to many of our problems, it is said." ROETTINGER, supra note 12, at 1.
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creased state efforts to obtain greater autonomy from federal political
processes on Capitol Hill,88 the Supreme Court, as in the past, represents
the bastion of change in modern legal thought on the principle.
A landmark case in support of the traditional powers of states, decided
in 1976, was National League of Cities v. Usery.89 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for a 6-3 majority of the Court, held that Congress lacked the jurisdic-
tional power under the Commerce Clause to regulate. the wages and
hours of state public employees engaged in "integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions."9 Among the many functions
considered to be under the jurisdiction of traditional state police powers
were matters concerning public health.9' Although later overruled,92 Na-
tional League breathed life into the principle of federalism as a limit on
federal power.
9 3
Other authors have equated new federalism with the legal movement among state courts
of the importance of state law and the independent interpretations of state constitutional
law that distinguish state rights from those at the federal level. See Lisa D. Munyon, It's A
Sorry Frog Who Won't Holler in his Own Pond: The Louisiana Supreme Court's Response
to the Challenges of New Federalism, 42 Loy. L. REv. 313 (1996).
88. See John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Politics and Public Health, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 203 (1996) ("The rush to shrink the federal government and reduce its costs,
propelled by the Republican-controlled Congress with the reluctant acquiescence of the
Clinton administration, has begun to change the Public Health Service and other federal
health agencies in important ways.").
89. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (In 1974 Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to
include virtually all employees of state and local governments under the coverage of the
act. Municipal and state governments challenged the amendment of the Act as an uncon-
stitutional intrusion upon the traditional functions of state and local governments). Id. at
836-37.
90. Id. at 852; see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (holding that
the Tenth Amendment restricts Congress from exercising power so as to impair the states'
integrity or their ability to function in a federal system).
91. National League, 426 U.S. at 851.
These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing
public services. Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are cre-
ated to provide, services such as these which States have traditionally afforded
their citizens.
Id.
92. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
93. With the promotion of Justice Rehnquist, a staunch supporter of state sovereignty,
to Chief Justice in 1986 and the addition of federalist Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the
Supreme Court has built upon the foundation it first laid in National League. Joan Bis-
kupic, Justices Shift Federal-State Power Balance, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al
("Rehnquist has made it his mission to protect states' rights since he joined the Court in
1971..."); Reuben, supra note 87, at 78-79. This is not to say that the Court's federalism
jurisprudence since National League has been consistent. As the Court acknowledged in
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In 1991,. the Court upheld a state constitutional provision requiring the
mandatory retirement of state judges against a challenge based on an ap-
parent conflict with the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 ("ADEA").94 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,95 the Court, per Justice 0'
Connor, held that the state constitutional provision was preempted by the
ADEA because appointed state judges were not covered under the Act
9 6
despite statutory language suggesting otherwise.97 Federalism was the
imprimatur for the Gregory decision. 98 As the Court stated, federalism
demands that certain matters are "decision[s] of the most fundamental
sort for a sovereign entity,"9 9 including "the power to prescribe the quali-
fications of [its] own officers."1 °° To allow Congress to interfere unequiv-
ocally with this right would "upset the usual constitutional balance of
federal and state powers." '' To this end, Congress must "make its inten-
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992), "[t]he Court's jurisprudence in this
area has traveled an unsteady path."
94. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 454 (1991). Article V, section 26 of the Mis-
souri Constitution required most state judges to retire at the age of seventy, including
those appointed by the governor. Several state judges subject to the mandatory retirement
provision challenged the law as violative of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1996), which makes it unlawful for
employers, including states and their political subdivisions, to discharge any individual who
is at least forty years old because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a),
630(b)(2) (1996). Accordingly, the judges argued, the state constitutional provision was
preempted by the ADEA, and thus was invalid. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456.
95. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
96. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467. The Court determined that appointed state judges were
not considered "employees" under the ADEA, relying on the ADEA's coverage exception
for any state employee who qualified as "an appointee on the policymaking level .... Id.
at 465, citing 29 U.S.C. Sec. 630(b)(2) (1996). Appointed state judges are exempted from
the Act, said the Court, not because they are necessarily defined as appointees on the
"policymaking level," but rather because the quoted phrase is "sufficiently broad that [the
Court] cannot conclude that the [ADEA] plainly covers appointed state judges." Gregory,
501 U.S. at 467. In other words, the Court was unwilling to interpret the ADEA to cover
appointed state judges unless Congress made it explicitly clear that judges are included. Id.
97. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct.
293, rev'd - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) ("the Court in Gregory refused to construe a
congressional act to reach state governmental functions in the absence of a clear statement
from Congress that it intended to do so.").
98. Recounting the historical development of the United States as a nation of united
sovereign states, Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457-60, Justice 0' Connor analogized federalism as a
constitutional concept of governmental design requiring a proper balance of power be-
tween the federal and state governments. For federalism to thrive, the powers of govern-
ments must be mutually restraining. Yet, stated the Court, "[the] twin powers [of
government] will act as mutual restraints only if both are credible." Id. at 459.
99. Id. at 460.
100. Id. at 460, citing Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900).
101. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
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tion unmistakably clear in the language of the statute," 10 2 that state law is
preempted where such may alter the balance of federalism. 1°3
While the "plain statement rule" of federal preemption had been adju-
dicated many times prior10 4 (and many times since'1 5), Gregory crafted
the role which federalism plays in determining the extent of federal
supremacy. Without limiting congressional jurisdiction, the Court condi-
tioned the exercise of federal power which infringed traditional state in-
terests on the political process. If traditional state interests are to be
preempted, it must be the result of the legislative process, which itself
features numerous protections to prevent the infringement of powers be-
tween levels of government. As a corollary, the states' ability to legislate
in areas fundamentally related to their sovereign interests without con-
gressional interference is strengthened.
102. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
103. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 462.
104. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
105. See Cipplone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). This case concerns
whether state tort and contract claims for personal damages resulting from a person's
smoking-related injuries and death were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Liggett
argued that the petitioner's state claims were preempted by federal statutes requiring man-
ufacturers to post health warnings on each cigarette package sold. The federal statutes'
contained preemption clauses with the general intent of prohibiting states from imposing
further requirements concerning cigarette advertising on manufacturers. The Court held
that two of the six state law claims were preempted. It presumed that "the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded unless that [is] the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." Id. at 2617 quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995). This case concerns the effectiveness of the state law imposition of a
surcharge on employee benefit plans under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) in light of ERISA's provision that it "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan." Id. at 1675. In revers-
ing the lower courts, the Supreme Court stated "in cases like this one, where federal law is
said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation . . . we have worked on the
'assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Id. at 1676.
(citations omitted). To stretch the "relate to" language of ERISA's preemption clause to
its furthest point would seriously conflict with the Court's presumption against federal pre-
emption. Id. at 1677; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, __ U.S. __, 116. S. Ct. 2240 (1996). This
caseconcerns whether the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 ("MDA"), which pro-
vided foe pre-market approval of medical devices by the Food and Drug Administration,
precluded product liability claims under state common law for damages resulting from de-
fective medical products. The Court held that state product liability claims may be brought
despite the general proscription of the MDA. Id. at 2245.
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The Court's subsequent decision in New York v. United States"' em-
phasized the principle of federalism in the public health context of a fed-
eral regulatory program designed to encourage states to take
responsibility for the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes. Whereas
Gregory concerned the authority of Congress to preempt state law, New
York concerned the circumstances in which Congress may use states as
"implements of regulation."1 °7 Without challenging the authority of Con-
gress to legislate in the field, the petitioners contended that the chosen
method of federal regulation violated the Tenth Amendment by directing
states how they, as sovereigns, should legislate in the field.1 °8 Striking
down a part of federal legislation requiring states to regulate consistent
with federal directives or be forced to "take title" to environmentally
damaged land, t °9 the Court held that Congress may not "commandee[r]
the legislative processes of States by directly compelling them to enact
106. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
107. Id. at 153. Petitioners, New York state and two of its counties, challenged several
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 ("the
Act"). Pub. L. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347. The Act set forth several federal incentives to states
in an attempt to require them to provide for the proper disposal of radioactive wastes
generated within their borders. Id. Among these incentives were (1) various monetary
rewards to states which achieved a series of waste site developments and (2) restricted
access provisions that would eventually allow states in compliance with the Act to turn
away radioactive wastes from non-complying states. New York, 505 U.S. at 153. "Take
title" provisions required states that failed to provide in a timely manner for the disposal of
radioactive wastes within their borders to take title to and possession of the wastes upon
the request of the waste's generator or owner. A state's failure to take title and possession
of such wastes would subject it to the liability of the waste generator or owner for all
damages suffered therein. Id. Petitioners did not dispute that Congress had the power to
legislate in the field of radioactive waste disposal. Id.
108. Id. at 159-60. This distinction is important to the outcome of the case, for the
Court believed that Congress could have simply preempted the field of radioactive waste
disposal under the Supremacy Clause to avoid a Tenth Amendment challenge. Id. at 160.
109. The Court found no constitutional problem with the first or second set of incen-
tives discussed, supra note 107. Both of these incentives were supported by affirmative
grants of the Spending and Commerce Clause powers to Congress, and thus were consis-
tent with the Tenth Amendment. New York, 505 U.S. at 171-74. However, the third set of
alleged incentives, which would require non-complying states to take title and possession
of in-state radioactive wastes (or suffer the liability resulting therefrom), were found to be
beyond the authority of Congress. Id. at 174-75. This third provision gave states two
choices: (1) legislate in the manner in which the federal government has demanded; or, (2)
be held liable to the citizens of your state who are responsible for the resulting damages.
Neither choice is constitutional since either alternative presented to the states would effec-
tively "'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes,
and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority be-
tween federal and state governments." Id. at 175.
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and enforce a federal regulatory program." ' While Congress can en-
courage state regulation or offer incentives to influence policy choices
made by states,"1' it cannot mandate state regulation. 1 2 States retain the
power to comply or not comply with the federal agenda in their discre-
tion. 1 3 The Court concluded that while federal enumerated powers are
subject to expansion under the broad nature of constitutional lan-
guage, 1 4 such expansion does not uproot the federalist structure underly-
ing the division of authority.
1 5
New York is particularly compelling in the field of public health law
because of instances, as with the disposal of radioactive waste, where uni-
110. Id. at 161 (relying on the legal principle elucidated in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)). The Constitution does not allow
Congress to instruct states how to legislate since its authority is based on the power to
regulate individuals, not states. New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
111. "[It] may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds," Id. (citing South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)), under the Spending Power, provided the conditions
bear some relationship to the purpose of federal spending. It also can offer states a choice
pursuant to the Commerce Clause between regulating activity according to federal stan-
dards, or having state law preempted by federal regulation in the spirit of "cooperative
federalism." New York, 505 U.S. at 167, citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65
(1982).
112. The Federal Government may not compel the states to enact or administer a fed-
eral regulatory program. New York, 505 U.S. at 180.
113. See Jesse H. Choper, Commentary: Federalism and Judicial Update, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 577, 583-84 (1994) for an additional discussion of the Court's holding in New
York.
114. New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57.
115. Id. at 159 ("The actual scope of the Federal Government's authority with respect
to the States has changed over the years... but the constitutional structure underlying and
limiting that authority has not."). Justice 0' Connor, for the majority, examined the au-
thority of Congress under the Constitution in two ways:
In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by
one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. In other
cases the Court has sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the
province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment.
Id. at 155 (citations omitted). "[I]n a case like this one, involving the division of authority
between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other."
Id.; cf. Martin H. Redish, Doing It with Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitu-
tional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
593, 594 (1994) (Justice O'Connor's premise is "totally false; significant practical conse-
quences flow from a reviewing court's choices between these two interpretive methodolo-
gies."). Justice 0' Connor further states: "If a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to
the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amend-
ment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress." New
York, 505 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted).
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form response can be critical to the containment of a national public
health problem. In a public health system driven by national objectives,
congressional legislation compelling state regulation and enforcement
may be the most expeditious manner of accomplishing such uniformity.
Since such national legislation is constitutionally suspect under the Tenth
Amendment, however, Congress must legislate carefully to avoid the ap-
pearance of requiring states to regulate on behalf of the federal govern-
ment. Regardless of legitimate congressional ends, federalism
requirements concerning the legislative process are an inherent part of
the political process,1 16 which cannot be undermined even to accomplish
urgent national public health goals.
In United States v. Lopez, 1 7 the Court applied new federalism in an-
116. Justice O'Connor further elaborated this point in New York. Where Congress at-
tempts to compelstate compliance with federal objectives, the damage inflicted upon state
sovereignty is reflected in the diminished voter accountability at both levels of govern-
ment. If, for example, a state's citizenry believes it to be in the interests of the state to
avoid federal compliance in a given field, it may elect state representatives that will act
upon their beliefs by rejecting such compliance. In such a case, Congress may choose to
preempt state regulation in the field whereby members of Congress from said state will
suffer the consequences should preemption prove unwise. However, where the federal
government directs states to legislate in an unwise manner, the state representatives will
directly face the political consequences of their actions, not the members of Congress per
se. As Justice 0' Connor summarizes, "[a]ccountability is thus diminished when, due to
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the
local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation." Id. at 169. The role of
individual voters, to which the government owes its existence, is thwarted and diminished.
This result is an abuse of government that federalism was designed to avoid by requiring
mandatory legislative safeguards inherent in the political process against federal intrusions
upon the states' traditional powers. -
' See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy, in a thoughtful concurring opinion joined by Justice 0' Connor, provided insight
into Justice 0' Connor's theory of political accountability as an underpinning of federal-
ism. Justice Kennedy acknowledged the double security of the rights of the people inher-
ent in a governmental system where different governments control each other as well as
themselves. Of course, the people control both governments. The ultimate benefit to the
citizenry of federalism is the enhanced liberty accorded in two governments versus one.
From this structure arises "two distinct and discernible lines of political accountability: one
between the citizens and the Federal Government; the second between the citizens and
the States." Id. at 576. To allow one government to overtake the other would blur "the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority.... [P]olitical responsibility
would become illusory." Id.
117. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The case involved a challenge to a provision of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 (Gun-Free Act), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(a) (1996), which made it
a federal criminal offense for "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at any place
[the individual] knows.., is a school zone." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. Congress relied upon
its commerce -power in legislating the offense. Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a minor at a San
Antonio, Texas, public high school, was charged with violating the Gun-Free Act after he
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other field of national public health concern, gun control among mi-
nors.118 Affirming the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals"19
that a minor could not be federally convicted for gun possession in school
in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,120 the United
States Supreme Court questioned the power of Congress to criminalize
the mere possession of a gun on the basis that such conduct substantially
affected interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.12 1 Unswayed
by government theories supporting congressional jurisdiction to proscribe
122 Corsuch crimes, the Court stated: "[I]f we were to accept the Govern-
admitted carrying a .38 caliber handgun and five bullets to school on the day he was ar-
rested. Lopez originally was charged with a violation of a Texas state law, Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994), prohibiting similar conduct. The state charges were
dropped when federal authorities charged the minor under the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 Supp V.). Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. Lopez
moved to dismiss the federal indictment on the ground that the underlying offense repre-
sented an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to legislate control over state public
schools. Id. The federal district court rejected Lopez's motion and tried and found him
guilty on the offense charged. Id.
118. See CHRISTOFFEL & TERET, supra note 26, at 202-03 ("Firearm injuries have been
a particular problem in the United States for centuries, so laws to control firearms are not
new .... Gun control has traditionally been a state and local concern."). However, the
Court in Lopez analyzed Congress' jurisdiction to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act
exclusively under the assumption that the Act was a criminal law (which, like public health,
is a matter primarily under the jurisdiction of states pursuant to their police powers). Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. at 561.
119. Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (1993).
120. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
121. Id. at 551-59. The Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress
can regulate lawfully under its modern commerce power. Congress may regulate: (1) the
use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce (even though a threat thereto may derive
solely from intrastate activities, id. at 558); and, (3) those activities having a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59. Under the final prong, legislation regu-
lating any economic activity which substantially affects interstate commerce is generally
upheld. Id. at 559. Since the first two prongs of Commerce Clause jurisdiction were inap-
plicable, the challenged provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act must have been law-
fully passed pursuant to the third prong of Commerce power. In other words, the federal
criminalization of the mere possession of a firearm in a school zone must economically, or
otherwise, substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 559.
122. The Government presented two theories supporting the exercise of the commerce
power, which relied on twisted, broad interpretations of what is substantially related to
interstate commerce in an economic sense. The first of these theories, labeled by the Court
as the "costs of crime reasoning," centered on the correlation between firearm possession
and violent crime, and the resulting effect the latter had on the national economy. The
second theory, the so-called "national productivity reasoning," focused on the substantial
threat to the educational process posed by the presence of guns in schools. The result of a
threatened educational system, it was argued, is a less productive citizenry which in turn
has an adverse effect on the economic well-being of the Nation. Id. at 1632.
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ment's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity.., that Con-
gress is without power to regulate."' 23 Clearly the Constitution withholds
from Congress "a plenary police power that would authorize enactment
of every type of legislation."' 24 Striking down the provision of the Act
under which Lopez was convicted, the Court concluded that to find
otherwise would require it "to pile inference upon inference in a manner
that woul'd ... convert congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States ....
This we are unwilling to do."' 25
The Court's denial of national police powers to Congress is a bold
statement concerning new federalism. 126 The power that Congress used
so. extensively during the New Deal to expand the federal presence in
public health was limited in the context of an important public health
objective of stemming the national crisis of death and injury resulting
from handgun use. In Printz v. United States,127 the Court recently con-
demned another exercise of federal power promoting gun control policy:
whether an unfunded provision of the Brady Bill requiring local law offi-
cials to investigate the backgrounds of handgun purchasers violates state
sovereignty under the New York theory that the federal government is
commandeering states to enforce federal objectives.' 28 The Court's deci-
sion rejecting Congress' attempt to require state officials to serve as
"agents" to enforce the federal Brady Bill, like its decision in Lopez,
strikes a blow in the national effort to control handgun violence.' 29 More
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1633, citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
125. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-58. Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion advocated a
reformulation of the "substantial relationship" prong of the Commerce Clause to prevent
the Congress from having "a police power over all aspects of American life." Id. at 584.
(Thomas, J., concurring). Although failing to present a reformulated test for future use,
Justice Thomas noted that the extension of the Commerce power to all matters substan-
tially related to interstate commerce has extended the federal government into areas un-
known to the constitutional Framers. Id. at 559. The Commerce power as it exists under its
present formulation gives Congress "a blank check." Id. at 602.
126. Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 644
(1996) ("[Lopez] ... was the first decision in some five decades to define any limit to the
meaning of the phrase 'commerce among the states'."). The Court's decision was particu-
larly compelling because fifty-four years earlier, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), it effectively gave Congress national police powers under the Commerce Clause.
127. __ U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
128. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Will Handle Dispute Over Investigating Gun Buy-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996, at A20; Joan Biskupic, Justices Joust Over States' Rights,
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1996, at A20.
129. Cf Joan Biskupic, Court Voids Background Check of Gun Buyer Under Brady
Law, WASH. POST, June 28, 1997, at Al ("The decision is likely to have limited impact on
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so, it threatens the cooperative nature of federal and state efforts in other
public health contexts by allowing states to opt out of federally-mandated
reporting, enforcement, and administrative requirements.
130
Two additional decisions of the Supreme Court in the past two years
have furthered the federalism trend. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorn-
ton, 3 the Court acknowledged the sovereign nature of state powers,
although it rejected an argument that states may impose term limits on its
federal representatives 132 in opposition to federal Constitutional require-
ments for holding office.33 The issue of new federalism settled in Greg-
gun control; most states already require background checks and the federal government is
developing a nationwide screening system to do the work that currently is left to local law
enforcement.").
130. See, e.g., Women's Community Health Ctr., Inc. v. Texas Health Facilities
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 974, 980 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The theory underlying the constitutional-
ity of the [National Health Planning and Resources Development] Act's 'requirement' that
the states pass and enforce legislation is that the states have chosen to accept this duty as a
condition for receiving federal grants.") (citations omitted).
131. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
132. The State of Arkansas argued that the Tenth Amendment empowers a state to
impose term limits on its own federal representative offices. Id. at 798. The voters of the
State of Arkansas adopted Amendment 73 to their state constitution, which was in part
intended to impose term limits on candidates for federal seats in both Houses of Congress.
A challenge among opposing voters in the state questioned the constitutionality of a state
law that attempted to alter the terms of qualification for federal office as set forth in Arti-
cle I of the United States Constitution. Id. at 784-85. Since the Constitution contains no
express provision prohibiting further qualifications at the state level, Arkansas concluded
that states must have been reserved the power to do so via the Tenth Amendment. Id. at
800. The question whether the federal Congress could alter the constitutional qualifica-
tions for its offices had already been answered by the Court in Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 540 (1969). Clearly, it could not. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 779. "[W]e reaffirm that
the qualifications for service in Congress set forth in the text of the Constitution are 'fixed,'
at least in the sense that they may not be supplemented by Congress." Id. at 798.
133. Although the states "unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign
authority," id. at 801, citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549
(1985), the power to add qualifications to federal offices is not a part of their powers.
Thornton, 514 U.S. at 802.
Justice Thomas in dissent argued that where the Constitution is silent on the question of
additional qualifications for federal offices, it impliedly allows the exercise of further
power by the states. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). States can exer-
cise all the powers which the Constitution does not withhold from them. Id. at 848. "The
Constitution derives its authority ... from the consent of the people of the States," id. at
851 (emphasis in original), not from the consent of state governments. That the Tenth
Amendment reserves those powers not delegated to the federal government "to the states
respectively, or to the people," means that the people, and not solely the government, can
decide the extent of those powers. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, as Justice Thomas
concluded, since neither the Qualifications Clause of Article I nor any other provision of
the Constitution prohibits the determination of further qualifications for office, the Tenth
Amendment must have reserved this power to the states or their people.
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ory, New York, and Lopez is the degree to which federal powers can
intrude on state sovereignty. Thornton simply reaffirms the other side of
federalism: the sovereign powers of states cannot be used to alter federal
constitutional law because federal law is supreme. Modification of the
supremacy of federal powers by states is not a part of the federalism de-
bate: federal powers have been absolved from such state intrusions since
McCulloch v. Maryland."' The Tenth Amendment's reservation of pow-
ers to states does not imply the supremacy of state uses of its police pow-
ers in contravention of the federal Constitution and laws.
The supremacy of federal statutory law was debated in the Court's sub-
sequent federalism decision, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,'35 con-
cerning an Eleventh Amendment 136 challenge to various provisions of
the federal Indian Gambling Regulatory Act,137 passed on authority of
the Indian Commerce Clause,'138 allowing Indian tribes to sue states in
federal court. The Seminole Indian Tribe asked the Court to extend Con-
gress' Eleventh Amendment abrogation authority under the Indian Com-
merce Clause.' 39 Instead, the Court withdrew its approval of its prior
134. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (invalidating the attempt by
Maryland to tax the issuance of bank notes by the newly created national bank).
135. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, _ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
136. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment supports two precepts of federalism: (1) that each
state is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and, (2) that, inherent in the nature of
sovereignty, each state is immune to suit without the sovereign's consent. Seminole Tribe,
116 S. Ct. at 1122; but see __ U.S. _ 116 S.Ct. at 1147 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
legislative history of the Constitution hardly warrants the conclusion drawn by some that
there was a general understanding, at the time of ratification, that the states would retain
their sovereign immunity.") (citations omitted).
137. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) et seq. (1996). The Act's provisions allow an Indian tribe to
engage in gaming activities on its reservation, but only pursuant to a valid compact be-
tween the tribe and its host state. A duty is imposed upon the states to negotiate in good
faith with Indian tribes toward the formation of a valid compact. If a state fails to negoti-
ate in good faith for this purpose, the Act authorizes an Indian tribe to compel such negoti-
ations by filing suit in federal court. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1119-20.
138. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
139. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. To abrogate state sovereign immunity Congress
must evidence the unequivocal intent to do so pursuant to a valid exercise of Congressional
power. Id. at 1123 citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). The Court acknowl-
edged that Congress had stated unequivocally its intention to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity under the Indian Gambling Regulatory Act. Id. at 1124. The remaining question
was whether Congress had acted pursuant to a valid exercise of the commerce power. Id.
at 1125. The Court previously had allowed Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity
only under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), or
the Interstate Commerce Clause. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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extension of congressional abrogation of state sovereignty under the
Commerce power. 140 As a result, states' rights not to be subjected to suit
under the Eleventh Amendment were strengthened. 1
Seminole Tribe demonstrates that federal governmental powers cannot
be exercised in contravention of federal constitutional law because consti-
tutional law is supreme. 142 In this sense, it reaffirms the flip-side of the
same federalism principle of Thornton. The decisions exhibit the Court's
intolerance of exercises of government power at the state or federal level,
which impede constitutional guarantees of power and immunity allotted
to each level. Together, they evince the fundamental division of state and
federal power in a federalist system of government.
B. Accomplishing National Public Health Objectives
New federalism represents the Court's return of legitimacy to state sov-
ereignty 43 through the calculated restraint of congressional legislative
power within the political process.1 44 New federalism has resulted in the
140. The sole case upholding Congress's abrogation rights under the Commerce power,
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), was overturned. Seminole Tribe, 116 S.
Ct. at 1128.
141. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete lawmaking authority over a particular area [as with the Indian Commerce
Clause], the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting States.").
142. Congress may not: (1) create statutory rights prohibited by the Constitution; (2)
remove rights guaranteed by the Constitution; or, (3) create a right which is inconsistent
with a constitutional objective. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1356 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, - U.S. - (1996), 117 S.Ct. 293 (1996), rev'd _ U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 2157
(1997).
143. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("What the concept [of federal-
ism] ... represent[s] is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments.") (emphasis added).
144. The federalism movement of the Supreme Court has not fallen on deaf ears in
Congress. In fact, the prevailing pattern of federalism decisions "appears to be in tune
with the prevailing political winds." Nagel, supra note 126, at 645. For example, in Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991), and subsequent preemption decisions, see Cip-
polone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., _ U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995); Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, _ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996), the Court acknowledged that Congress had
the power to override traditional state law in the pursuit of federal interests through strong
preemption language. Its refusal to hold that state law was preempted under the plain
statement rule evidences the Court's recognition of the political difficulty in negotiating
forceful preemption language, and thus the likelihood that state law would remain intact.
Some argue that recent federalism jurisprudence represents the Court's attempt to
restructure American government. See Nagel, supra note 126, at 643-44. It is contended
that federalism and its accompanying emphasis on states' rights represent a politically-
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Court's adoption of a super-strong rule against federal invasion of "core
state functions,' 45 a presumption against the application of federal stat-
utes to state and local political processes, 146 and a disdain for federal ac-
tion that "commandeers" state governments, whether legislatively or
through the use of state agents, into the service of federal regulatory pur-
poses. 147 The Commerce powers, expanded greatly during the New Deal,
have been reigned in to a degree. 48 Collectively, the cases illustrate the
reality of federalism as a powerful, substantive tool of constitutional
law.' 49 Their strength lies in their diversity. Virtually any case where fed-
eral and state interests collide presents an opportunity for a federalism
argument.
The impact of new federalism on the field of public health law is seen
in the history of public health regulation. The metamorphosis of public
health regulation from purely local to predominantly national means re-
sulted from increased federal presence in the field corresponding to a de-
emphasis on traditional federalism. It is an inescapable conclusion that
an increased federal presence shifted public health goals. National public
health priorities dominate local ones. New federalism restrains the fed-
eral intrusion on state public health powers by requiring Congress to op-
acceptable means to decentralize governmental power. Justice O'Connor acknowledges
the maintenance of a decentralized government as one of the advantages of the federalist
structure. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. While "[r]estoring true federalism [would] require the
'most fundamental restructuring of state and federal relations since the New Deal,"' Reu-
ben, supra note 87, at 77, such is not the Court's intent. It has not come close to restructur-
ing government in the United States, nor will it. See Nagel, supra note 126, at 655 ("It
seems doubtful ... that a majority of the Justices favor significant decentralization ... the
record as a whole is mixed enough to cast doubt on the idea that devotion to decentralized
decision-making is now an overriding value for most members of the Court."). Id. While
federalism principles presumably allow the Court to paint with a broad brush, its decisions
exhibit narrow, accurate strokes.
145. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544-46 (1994); Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 251,. (1994); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504
(1992); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
146. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991).
147. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, -
U.S. _, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997).
148. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
__ U.S. - ,116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Lopez stripped Congress of national police powers.
Seminole Tribe limited Congress' ability to subject states to suit in federal court under the
Interstate Commerce Clause.
149. "There is no going back on federalism," said Professor Susan Low Bloch of Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. "This is something Rehnquist and O'Connor have been
working toward for years and now that they have the votes they are not likely to stop" in
their federalism jurisprudence. Joan Biskupic, Vexing Social Issues Portend A Stirring
Term for Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at A6.
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erate within the constraints of the political process. As a result, state
police powers exercised in the interest of public health are strengthened
emphatically by the political process confining federal authority to enter
the field.
These summary points are illustrated in Association of Community Or-
ganizations for Reform Now ("ACORN") v. Edwards,15 ° where the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently struck down provisions of the Lead
Contamination Control Act ("LCCA") requiring states to establish reme-
dial action programs for the removal of lead contaminants from school
and day-care water fountains.'51 The State of Louisiana claimed the
LCCA's provisions were unconstitutional based on the New York theory
that they compelled state compliance with a federal regulatory program.
The circuit court agreed, at least concerning the LCCA's requirement
that states develop remedial programs or be subject to civil sanctions.
The requirement that states develop a program to further the federal gov-
ernment's purposes, or be subject to civil suit, "is no choice at all."' 52
Rather it represents "an attempt by Congress to force States to regulate
according to congressional direction. As the New York Court explained,
the Constitution does not permit Congress to so control the States' legis-
lative processes."' 5 3 Thus, despite the legitimate public health objective
of the LCCA, the court in ACORN was compelled by federalism con-
cerns to strike down the particular manner in which Congress chose to
legislate.
New federalism does not tell us as a society that we are wrong to priori-
tize public health duties in terms of national goals. 5 4 There are concrete
150. 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996).
151. The Lead Contamination Control Act ("LCCA") was enacted by Congress in 1988
in response to the national public health concern that children were exposed to unsafe
amounts of lead in their drinking water. Id. at 1388. The Environmental Protection
Agency was charged primarily with the administration of the Act. States were only re-
quired to implement the Agency's recommendations as to lead-safe water fountains and
"establish a program . . . to assist local educational agencies in . . . remedying lead
contamination at schools." 42 U.S.C. § 300j-24(b)(d) (1996). When the State of Louisiana
failed to comply in a timely manner with the Act, a local public interest group sued the
state governor and Department of Health and Hospitals under a citizen's suit provision of
the Safe Drinking Water Act (which the LCCA amended).
152. ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394.
153. Id. In this sense, the LCCA works an unconstitutional intrusion upon a state's
sovereign prerogative to legislate as it sees fit. Id.
154. However, the Institute of Medicine's assessment of the existing nationalized struc-
ture in 1988 certainly raises questions as to the overall effectiveness of the public health
system. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 19-34; see also Stanley J. Reiser, Com-
mentary: Medicine and Public Health, 276 JAMA 1429 (1996) ("By the 1990's ... the
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reasons for the shift of public health from local to national goals, includ-
ing the containment of public health concerns, which can be accom-
plished only through national policy. Nor does new federalism require
the abandonment of national public health goals to return public health
powers to the states that originally held them. Rather, it requires us to
develop appropriate public health law strategies, which accomplish na-
tional objectives without infringing state sovereignty.
Regulating in the interests of public health may require refocusing on
state public health powers.155 National public health objectives may be
accomplished through states directly by encouraging them to enact uni-
form legislation at their own level. Although the potential for differences
in state enforcement and timing of legislative enactments is disadvanta-
geous, federalism concerns are minimized. Of those public health objec-
tives requiring national implementation, new federalism suggests
accomplishing them by persuading, rather than requiring, states to com-
ply. National legislation, which proposes legitimate incentives to states,
such as federal funds or national expertise, in return for their voluntary
cooperation, comports with a federalist system of government.
The reality of new federalism, however, is that public health goals, left
exclusively to governmental political processes at either level, are subject
to delays and off-target measures inherent in the struggle over limited
governmental powers. It suggests that efforts to accomplish national pub-
lic health objectives may be more productive if vested in the private sec-
tor. The role of managed care organizations, for example, in improving
public health is an increasingly important topic of study and discussion.
156
United States continued to top all other nations in health care spending but got unaccept-
ably poor returns measured by patterns of health and illness in its population.").
155. This suggestion is not necessarily detrimental. The reality of the federal political
process is that federal legislation and regulation invariably represents a compromise to the
accomplishment of specific goals. In an overly-centralized government, national public
health objectives may remain unfulfilled in light of watered-down national legislation en-
forced by bureaucratic, non-accountable federal agencies. While the state legislative pro-
cess involves compromises like those seen in the federal Congress, state governments may
be more responsive to the needs of their citizenry. State governments serve vital functions
as innovators and pioneers of public health policy. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458 (1991); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(the States serve a valuable role "as laboratories for experimentation to devise various
solutions where the best solution is far from clear" citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Since public health needs differ from state to state, na-
tionalizing public health priorities to the exclusion of states could be harmful.
156. See e.g., Paul K. Halverson et al., Not-So-Strange Bedfellows: Models of Interaction
Between Managed Care Plans and Public Health Agencies, 75 MILBANK Q. 113 (1997);
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The issue is not so much whether regulating public health is in the inter-
ests of private sector health organizations, 157 but whether a systematic
and reliable infrastructure of private sector public health regulation can
be developed with encouragement from government. Subsequent issues
such as whether private sector public health could be uniform in applica-
tion and whether market forces would be any more effective than purely
governmental processes also arise. Yet, as public health goals mature fur-
ther to reflect international (versus purely national) objectives, market
Sources of regulation may become a primary source of public health con-
trol in a global economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The interrelation of federalism and public health law is evident. Feder-
alism has shaped the scope of governmental power to control public
health, producing fundamental shifts in our conception of public health
objectives. Public health goals once conceptualized in relation to exer-
cises of state police powers and limited to localized concerns have broad-
ened to accomplish national objectives through the expansion of federal
powers. The destruction of traditional federalism during the New Deal
was largely responsible for this federal expansion. The reemergence of
federalism preserving state powers suggests that Congress must legislate
carefully if it wishes to accomplish national public health objectives or, in
the alternative, that state police powers be used to accomplish public
health goals which the federal government cannot. While the abandon-
ment of national public health objectives is not required, the use of gov-
ernment powers to accomplish these objectives must be done through the
political system in which governmental power is distributed. Thus, new
federalism does not threaten the national conception of public health as
much as it challenges us to develop new strategies to fulfill the public
health needs, a part of which includes developing market-driven public
health goals for private sector health organizations.
William L. Beery et al., Managed Care and Public Health: Building a Partnership, 13 PUB-
LIC HEALTH NURSING 305 (1996); Institute of Medicine, Healthy Communities: New Part-
nerships for the Future of Public Health-A Report of the First Year of the Committee on
Public Health (1996).
157. See, e.g., Beery, supra note 156, at 306 ("directly concerned with'maximizing the
health of enrolled populations, managed care systems have a concrete need for applying
public health expertise .... Both managed care and public health clearly benefit from
healthier communities.")
